Abstract
Over the last decade,
Nigeria has been experiencing rising insecurity across different sections of
the country, with the most destructive being the rising level of Boko Haram
terrorism in the Northern part of the country. Since the Boko Haram uprising in
2009, the Nigerian government has employed various leadership strategies such
as counter-terrorism measures to stem the atrocities of the group. These
leadership strategies include amnesty negotiations, implementation of emergency
law in the northeast, increase in security spending to the deployment of
military force.
This study adopted the contingency theory for this study. In
the midst of these security measures, the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF)
emerged, first as a community effort, and later as a joint effort with the
security forces to help fight Boko Haram. Between 2009 and 2018, several
military operations were launched in order to boast the military command
leadership in Nigeria’s north east and how they have affected the fight against
insurgency and operation lafiya dole in particular. They includes: operation
Crackdown to clear remnants of Boko Haram from Sambisa Forest, operation Gama
Aiki to clear remnants of Boko Haram from the northern part of Borno State,
operation Safe Corridor to de-radicalise and rehabilitate repentant Boko Haram
fighters, Operation Chikin Gudu was conducted in July 2017 in Marte LGA, Borno
State, Operation Ruwan Wuta was launched in September 2017, followed by
Operation Ruwan Wuta II in October 2017, Operation Ruwan Wuta III in December
2017, and finally Operation Ruwan Wuta IV in February 2018. On 1 May 2018, the
Nigerian army launched a four-month-long operation in Borno North District
called Operation Last Hold. The operation was conducted as part of the
Operation Lafiya Dole. It was intended to ensure the destruction of Boko Haram
camps and strong points in the Nigerian side of Lake Chad Basin and enable the
rescue of hostages still held by the insurgents.
Keywords: Command and
Leadership, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Operation Lafia Dole.
Introduction
The military
institution is unarguably the most important state institution, not only
because they have the mandate to protect the territorial integrity of the state
but also its internal cohesion. A military is an organization authorized by its
greater society to use coercive instruments, including use of weapons, in
defending the motherland by combating actual or perceived threats. The
International Committee of the Red Cross in its customary law has provided a
most universally accepted definition of armed forces of a party to the conflict
as consisting of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates (ICRC,
2011). The Military has been dominant for most of the history of
post-independent Nigeria, before the country finally transited to democratic
rule in 1999 (Duruji, 2008).
In Nigeria, two major
context-specific events have had the farthest-reaching
impact on the Nigerian
army since the return to democratic governance in 1999;the first is the series
of efforts that sought to transform, re-professionalize and reinvent the
military as a political actor for democratic stability (see Ehwariene 2011;
Magbadelo 2012; Elaigwu 2013).
The modern Nigerian
military of today is the composite of the army, navy and air-force. The entire
military is administered by the Federal Ministry of Defence (MOD). From the
records of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the functions of the Nigerian
military include:
1. To maintain men of the Nigerian Armed
Forces in a state of combat readiness on land, sea and air;
2. To maintain a proper balance in arms
and men to meet needs of internal and external security;
3. To make provisions for the welfare of
the men of the Armed Forces in terms of training, accommodation, health care
and other benefits aimed at boosting their morale;
4. To enhance the capabilities and
sophistication of the country’s defence industries, in order to reduce the
country’s dependence on foreign sources of supply;
5. To enhance security in the African
continent by promoting a collective defence system through bilateral,
sub-regional and continental co-operation;
6. To contribute towards peace and
stability in the world through the United Nations Organization (UNO) the
African Union; (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
and
7. To be responsible for the formulation
and execution of the National Defence Policy.
Furthermore,
operational leadership qualities being employed have given the military new
direction in the ongoing fight against insurgency in Nigeria. Leadership has
existed for as long as people have interacted, and it is present in all
cultures, no matter what their economic or social makeup is. Leadership is not
only a human quality; it is found in primitive forms in many animal species,
from low level vertebrate such as chickens to higher level primates such as
gorillas and whales. Through observation and experimentation, especially
conducted the animals own natural settings, it can be deduced that there exists
a clear hierarchy or pecking order of leadership and that leadership grants
privileges to those who have it (bass, 1990).
Through the 1960s, leading organizational theorists regarded the concept
of leadership to be worthy of serious intellectual inquiry. Scholars such as
Webber, Barnard and Selznick believe that one could not fully understand what
whose in organizations believe or how they behave without reference to the
presence (or absence) of organizational leaders. Leaders are the source of
institutionalize values which, in turn, condition the actions of organizational
members.
Four
factors of leadership
There are four major
factors in leadership (U.S. Army, 1983):
a. Leader:- you must have an honest
understanding of who you are, what you know, and what you can do. Also
note that it is the followers, not the leader or
someone else who determines if the leader is successful. If they do not trust
or lack confidence in their leader, then they will be uninspired. To be
successful you have to convince your followers, not yourself or your superiors,
that you are worthy of being followed.
b. Followers: - different people require
different styles of leadership. For example, a new hire requires more
supervisors than an experience employee does. The fundamental starting point is
having a good understanding of human nature, such as needs, emotions, and
motivations.
c. Communication:- you lead through two-way
communication. Much of it is non-verbal. What and how you communicate either
builds or harms the relationship between you and your employees.
d. Situation:- all situations are different.
What you do in one situation will not always work in another. You must use your
judgment to decide the best cause of action and the leadership styles needed
for each situation.
Boko Haram terrorism
remains a major threat engaging the Nigerian military. Though, the insurgency
has been defeated as no territory of Nigeria is under the control of
insurgents, there are marauding elements of the Sect that still cause mayhem in
some parts of the North East theatre. Hitherto, the Boko Haram insurgents
captured and occupied territories in North East with some areas even renamed to
Caliphates. The ongoing counter insurgency and counter terrorism operation in
the North East; nicknamed Operation LAFIYA DOLE has remained focused in terms
of operational leadership on attaining its mandate of decisively defeating the
Boko Haram insurgents in the North East Theatre of Operation.
Throughout history the
world has been plagued by insurgencies. While the underlying causes of each new
insurgency have been different and the various leadership strategies employed
to tackle it, they are all similar in certain areas. This similarity entails
that the effective countering of an insurgency can be turned into a science
with a set of guidelines to follow based on conditions on the ground.
Guidelines are important because insurgencies are flexible and to defeat them
the counter-insurgency must be equally flexible if not more flexible. Good
intelligence is critical to the success of an insurgency. With their small,
poorly equipped forces, the leaders of insurgencies need to know when to strike
and when to pull back. This reliance on intelligence means that an effective
counterinsurgency must also rely on good intelligence so that the
counterinsurgents may know where the insurgency will strike, where they are
based, how they are supplied, where they keep their weapons, and other
essential pieces of information.
Historical
background of Boko Haram Insuregency in Nigeria
Boko Haram started as a
group made up of perceived socially excluded, deprived and unemployed set of
Islamic seminary students of late Mohammed Yusuf. The sect withdrew from the
larger society in 1992 and established a camp in Kannamma Village of Yobe State
and tagged themselves ahalul sunnah waljama hijirah and/or the Nigerian
‘Taliban’ and launched several attacks on divisional ‘Yusufiyya’ later metamorphosed and embraced
the most extreme and advanced teachings from hijirah to Jama’atul Ahalul Sunna
Waljama’a Lidda a’ wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD) with significant number of members
resigning themselves to fate and willing to die in planned attacks. Blum as
cited by Bintube (2015) described the nature of suicide bombings by the Boko
Haram as involuntarily administered suicide Furthermore, in recent times, Boko
Haram has been variously described as a hydra-headed monster that inflicts
pain, with every attack, on the structure of the Nigerian society in what Blum
as cited bombing, referred to as colossal collateral damage.
Nigerians have
witnessed, almost helplessly, the reckless destruction of human lives and
properties, especially in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, amongst
others, where Islam is the dominant religion. In fact Boko Haram’s attempts to
barbarize and terrorize Nigeria and Nigerians have grown, largely unchecked,
and many observers fear that the most populous black nation on earth may be
wiped out of existence because of the massiveness of the daily security threats
in the recent past, though drastically reduced by the Buhari administration. It
took Jonathan administration up to about three years to have any reasonable
reading of the Boko Haram situation. Igbonovia & Edobor-Igbonovia (2013)
argue that in the Nigerian national context, words do not match action as
reflected in the lamentations:
It appears that the
government of the day has given up on the insecurity in the country. For some
months now, hardly a day passes without an accident of bombing or shooting
taking place in Nigeria. In all of this, lives are usually lost and valuable
properties destroyed…. The Federal Government….does not appear to have an
answer to the security challenges. Government has been running from pillar to
post, striving to deal with the issues. But rather than make any head way, the
menace continue to rear its ugly head.
The emergence of Boko
Haram insurgency in Nigeria has not only affected the strategic calculation of
internal security in the country but has also completely altered the shape of
the domestic security equation. Apart from the threat to security, the sect has
reconfigured the theme of the age-long strategic notion of security through
state-centric grandiose military preparedness.
The Boko Haram,
hitherto a relatively simple and mechanical group of socially excluded Islamic
seminary students graduated to a violent, destructive, complex and organic one
capable of confronting the Nigerian military. The sects also labelled an
instrument of political re-engineering being used by unscrupulous political
elements to stage a proxy war in their quest for political power, thereby
threatening government, institutions and targeted civilian populations in their
insurgency to achieve their political end. The fact that Boko Haram emerged
from a collapsed Borno Empire there is the notion that Yusuffiya Boko Haram is
viewed as an instrument for resurrecting a dead empire. Others see the Boko
Haram as freedom fighters from the perspective of their frequent prison breaks
and freeing of inmates. This view supported the work of some writers who
observed that injustice, inequality and dehumanisation bred the crisis of
Yusuffiya Boko Haram insurgency which Nigeria is facing today.
In line with Wicker’s
thoughts as cited by Bintube (2015), Boko Haram insurgence was created out of
perceived injustices of our time, and of a state that has no compunction about
murdering people in the name of justice. The celebrated cases of the
dehumanizing extrajudicial killings of the Boko Haram leader and members in
Nigeria between Wednesday 29th and 30th of July 2009 are classical cases that
resulted in Boko Haram revolts and expansions and leading to what Blum referred
to as ‘colossal collateral damage’ to the society.
Theoretical
framework
Contingency
theory
Contingency theory of
leadership focus on particular variables related to the environment that might
determine which style of leadership is best suited for a particular work
situation. According to this theory, no single leadership style is appropriate
in all situations. Success depends upon a number of variables, including:
leadership styles, qualities of followers, and situational features (charry,
2012). A contingency factor is thus any condition in any relevant environment to
be considered when designing an organization or one of its elements (Naylor,
1999). Contingency theory states that effective leadership depends on the
degree of fit between a leader’s qualities and leadership style and that
demanded by a specific situation (lamb, 2013).
An
overview of operation Lafiya Dole and its command leadership
It is part of the
Constitutional duty of the Nigerian Government through its security
institutions to defend its territorial integrity protect lives and properties
of citizens. Obviously, this Constitutional role of the Federal Government
informed the existence of several operations across the Country, Operation
Lafiya Dole inclusive. The operation was necessitated by the activities of the
dreaded Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’ await Wal-Jihad popularly known as Boko
haram. The sect profoundly declared war against the Nigerian State beginning
with Borno State precisely on 26th July, 2009 when they had an encounter with
operation flush (I) and (II), during a burial precession where the security
agents enforcing the use of helmet stopped them to comply with the law. That
was when the residents of Maiduguri, Schools and the Police College came under
simultaneous heavy attacks by the insurgents that night (Musa, 2014 p152-164).
Since then, the Federal Government through the Military has been on ground in a
theatre to combat the activities of the terrorists in the Northeast Region.
The Operation was named
Operation Lafiya Dole from BOYONA by Lt Gen TY Buratai on assumption of Office
as the Chief of Army Staff in 2015. The Northeast comprises states of Borno,
Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Taraba. The operation started as Operation
Flush (I) between 2007-2008 to enforce a law aimed at reducing accidents in
Borno State by making it Compulsory for Motorcycle users used helmet and was
conducted by troops from the Borno Police Command and 21 Armoured Brigade,
Maiduguri. Later, as a result of resistance to adherence by the populace,
Operation Flush (II) was introduced by the State Government by Governor Ali
Modu Sheriff that finally ignited the Bokoharam war on the State in July, 2009.
In 2011, when the war was taking more sophisticated dimension, the Federal
Government under President Goodluck Jonathan, renamed the operation to Joint
Task Forces (JTF) and deployed Federal Troops Massively in the State. In 2013
when the war extending to neighbouring States of Yobe and Adamawa, the Federal
Government in an attempt to extend troops to those States renamed the operation
to ‘Operation BOYONA’ meaning Operation Borno, Yobe and Adamawa until 2015 when
the present Chief of Army Staff was appointed by the President Buhari APC led
Administration and renamed the Operation’s from BOYONA to ‘Operation Lafiya
Dole’.
Nigeria’s
Counter-Insurgency Operations since 2009
It is indeed no doubt
that the insurgents have deliberately put the Nigerian armed forces in a
protracted warfare, using different unconventional military approaches. As
such, the military in order to catch up with the insurgents evolutionary tactics
have lunched different special military operations in Borno and beyond. The
first security outfit that combated the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Liddawa’ati wal
Jihad group was the joint taskforce codenamed ‘operation flush’. As the name of
this operation indicated, the early violent posture of the group coupled with
other security challenges necessitated the government of Borno state to come up
with ‘operation flush I & II’ in 2009, which was headed by the Nigerian
Mobile Police Force in collaboration with the Nigerian Army. Operatives of this
special operation were overwhelmed by the July 2009 crisis with high ranking
commanders of the taskforce paying the supreme price. Subsequently other
operations were initiated, which included:
Operation Mesa, Operation Restore Order, Operation BOYANA, Operation
Zaman Lafia and ‘Operation Lafia Dole’ (Attah, 2019).
Operation BOYANA was a
joint operation comprised of all the security operatives both paramilitary and
military, aimed at tackling the various aspects of the security challenges in
three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. However, in August 18, 2013, 7
Division of the Nigerian Army was created, and a new operation was lunched,
codified, ‘Operation Zaman Lafia’. This operation was the watershed to complete
military-counter insurgency, as the operation was solely carried out by the
Nigerian Army headquarters while other security forces were excluded (Attah
2019). But it is noteworthy that this fundamental change did not come without
major setbacks in the counter-insurgency operation, as it led to acute
inter-agency rivalries among civil and military security agencies alike. A
typical pointer to this discord was the fact that from the period Operation
Zaman Lafia was lunched, to the end of 2014, the insurgent group held over
20,000 square kilometers of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states affecting 10 local
government areas. It is against this backdrop that the Nigerian general
election scheduled to hold on February 14, 2015 was postponed to March 28,
2015, to give way for military clearance of the insurgents controlled areas.
The military successfully dislodged the insurgents in most of the areas where
they had direct control, before the rescheduled election. Nevertheless, huge
success recorded in this direction was partly attributed to Close Air Support
supposedly mounted by some hired foreign mercenaries.
Operation Lafia Dole
came into force in July 21, 2015 after the general election which ushered in a
regime change in Nigeria. President Mohammed Buhari who won the election among
other things promised to bring the scourge of the insurgency to an end. As part
of this effort, General Tukur Yusufu Buratai an indigene of Borno state was
appointed Chief of Army Staff, who in return declared ‘Operation Lafia Dole’,
which literally means ‘peace by force’.
Responses
to the Insurgency by the Military Command
Government’s primary
response has been to re-organize its key military leadership in the troubled
north-east of the country a strategy that appears largely cosmetic. The game
changer is more likely to come from dealing with several blind spots in the
military’s approach to Boko Haram. Altering military commanders each time a
problem arises has been implemented before, with little impact on the
counter-terrorism effort. Over the last two years, leadership has changed on
four occasions. This time the most significant reshuffle was of the Theatre
Commander overseeing the campaign against Boko Haram. The new head of Operation
Lafiya Dole, Major General Abba Dikko, replaced Major General Rogers Nicholas
who occupied the position for less than a year. Beyond leadership, three top
concerns undermine the army’s current position:
1. The military must investigate why a
number of its bases have suffered attacks in close succession.
2. The use of intelligence must be deepened
to include closer collaboration with local community actors who are familiar
with the terrain in which Boko Haram operates.
3. The grievances of soldiers must be
addressed to improve morale.
The Nigerian Armed
Forces has 130,000 active frontline personnel and 32,000 reserve personnel,
ranking it 47th in the world in terms of conventional potential strength. It is
reputed to be well-versed in counter-insurgency due to its wealth of experience
in operating in insurgency environments such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and the
recent operations in Mali, as well as successive participation in both the
United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) led peacekeeping operations across
the world. Since the Congo crisis in 1960, Nigeria has contributed both
military and police personnel to more than 40 peacekeeping operations
worldwide. By June 2013, about 5,000 officers and men of the Nigerian Armed
Forces were serving in nine UN Peacekeeping missions within and outside
Africa. Nigeria’s major
response to the insurgency since 2010 has been the deployment of its Joint Task
Force (JTF), consisting of the Army, Air Force, Navy, State Security Services,
and Police under unified command structures. It encourages increased intelligence-sharing,
force coordination and unity of direction, which are considered essential for
any counterinsurgency operation, although this has been limited.
The Nigerian parliament
passed anti-terrorism legislation, originally introduced in 2011, in 2013. The
law was designed, in part, to facilitate greater counterterrorism coordination,
but interagency cooperation and information sharing remains limited by
Nigeria’s federal structure, which has caused confusion between chief state
security officers and federally-controlled security forces. Nigerian JTF
counterinsurgency operations in the northeast have been generally repressive,
relying heavily on military-led operations to kill and capture ‘scores’ of Boko
Haram insurgents since the movement was first brutally crushed in 2009.
Operation
Lafiya Dole and the need for Purposeful Leadership
Leadership is perhaps
one of the most important factors in the ongoing operations in Nigeria’s north
east against boko haram insurgency. The political leadership demonstrates
political will that provides strong and purposeful direction that galvanized
the nation against the threats, thereby enhancing public perception towards the
defeat of the common enemy. On
the other hand, the military leadership invariably draws inspiration from the
political will and gives the military strategic objectives that must be
achieved. Troops of Operation LAFIYA DOLE have continued to conduct sustained
offensive actions against the terrorists as well as other threats to peace and
security in the North East Region, particularly in the last 2 years. In order to enhance the offensive and
manoeuvre capability of troops in Operation LAFIYA DOLE, the Nigerian Army
introduced the Mobile Brigade Concept of operation. Accordingly, 5 well-resourced mobile strike
teams were established to cover specific areas within the Theatre, with a view
to ensuring complete dominance through aggressive firepower and mobility.
Huntington (1957) states that, war is the continuation of policy by other means
with senior military professionals providing security to the state while
serving as military advisers to the politicians, who practice their expertise
in the realm of politics and national strategy.
In addition, the
Military Command needs to be firm to appoint suitable field commanders,
assemble the resources and provide adequate welfare for the troops. This is key
to the achievement of the desired end-state. At the Military Strategic level,
the name of the operation was changed to its present name; operation lafiya
dole and the theatre was reorganized, while other measures were adopted at the
Operational and Tactical levels. This is anchored on provision of strategic
guidance that is focused, determined and inspires subordinate commanders and
troops to undertake assigned tasks.
Constraints
on Military Leadership in the Fight against Insurgency
The Nigerian military
has become the symbol of the perceived failure of the Nigerian state in the
popular imagination because of its failure to defeat or at least contain the
Boko Haram insurgency, even though preparation for this kind of asymmetric
enemy is often difficult. Nigerian army, as always has been performing
creditably in the discharge of its constitutional mandate with remarkable
successes. However, in-spite of these achievements, the Nigerian army is also
faced with some challenges. These challenges have also permeated to affect the
performance of the Nigerian army. Some of which are;
1. Lack of adequate and timely information
2. Inadequate logistics
3. Inadequate manpower
4. Budgetary constraint
5. Complexity of civilian protection
6. Perverse role of the media/internet
7. Negative activities of NGOS/CSOS among
others remain serious challenges to the Nigerian Army in the discharge of the
assigned tasks.
Nigeria’s
overstretched, under-resourced, and corruption plagued military have struggled
to consolidate its gains, Civilians in many parts of the northeast face ongoing
threats from both insurgent attacks as well as counterterrorism operations.
Conclusion
The Boko Haram
insurgency has engaged the attention of Nigerians and the Nigerian Government
which has led to the establishment of a number of controls to try and curtail
the excesses of the sect, ranging from declarations of state of emergency,
deployment of the military, house-to-house raids, mounting of security check
points at designated spots along major highways as well as seeking the
cooperation of neighbouring countries (Anyebe, 2017 ). Currently, there are
visible signs of progress, particularly in the areas of force structure,
selection, recruitment and training. Also, there has been a remarkable
improvement in troop’s attitude and welfare, generally (Ihejirika, 2013:12).
Strong effective
leadership is essential for to success in asymmetric war such as Boko Haram
insurgency and the counter-insurgency operation of the Nigerian military code
named ‘operation Lafiya Dole’. For command leadership to be effective, Nigerian
government and indeed the Nigerian military need as a matter of urgency imbibe
a new culture in the fight against insurgency in the north east, which will in
turn affect the overall successes in her counter-insurgency operations. These
includes:
1. Transform its army from garrison-bound
into an aggressive force in order to completely disseminate boko haram.
2. Wage war on corruption
3. Increase its budgeting on
counter-insurgency operations.
4. Imbibe new culture of command
leadership coordination among commanders as well as troops on the battle field.
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