Abstract
Strategy and organization theory enjoy
a reawakening interest in historical analysis. In this essay, we suggest that
this engagement should include strategy’s linkage to the history of military strategy.
We develop our argument through an exegesis of Carl von Clausewitz’ treatise On
War. We claim that Clausewitz’ theorization of strategy advances the ongoing
scholarly conversation on the practice of strategy in three specific ways.
First, he defines a distinctive locus for the notion of strategy as the bridge
between policy and tactics; in so doing, he addresses what has been criticized
as strategy’s conceptual drift. Second, with Clausewitz, we can pose the
question of strategy’s effectiveness in a critical, reflexive way. This opens
up a way to answer the “so-what” question that has hampered strategy as
practice research. Third, as an educator in military affairs of the Crown
Prince, Clausewitz invites reflection on strategy’s pedagogy. Following Clausewitz,
strategy may not want to concern itself with distilling the next practice from
past history but immerse strategy students in great detail in history in order
to develop their critical faculties.