CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND AMNESTY PROGRAMME THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA

ABSTRACT

         This issue of crisis is a global phenomenon but the method and approaches employed in managing and controlling the crisis at any given time is the points of significant which make the different, hence the peculiarity and important attached to any crisis situation depend largely on the publicity and consequence of the crisis.

This research work will attempt to examine the role of amnesty introduced by the federal government of Nigeria. However this research work is divided into four chapters in which chapter one is the introduction of the study, statement of the problem, chapter two is the literature review and theoretical frame work, while the chapter three is the dimensions of the conflict in the Niger Delta and chapter four is the assessment of Amnesty program in Niger Delta, summary and conclusion.            

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page                                                                                           i

Certification                                                                                      iii

Dedication                                                                                        iv

Acknowledgement                                                                             v

Abstract                                                                                           vii

Table of content                                                                               viii    

CHAPTER ONE

1.0     Introduction                                                                            1

1.1            Historical background                                                              2

1.2            Statement of the research problem                                            7

1.3            Objectives of the study                                                             8

1.4            Significance of the study                                                           9

1.5            Methodology of the study                                                         9

1.6            Scope of study                                                                        10

1.7            Conceptual clarification                                                            10

Reference                                                                                 13

CHAPTER TWO

2.1            Literature review                                                                         15

2.2            Theoretical framework                                                                39

Reference:                                                                                  47

CHAPTER THREE

3.1            The dimension of the conflict in the Niger Delta                            49

3.2            The methodology stage/phase                                                      51

3.3            The colonial/independence period                                                53

3.4            Post-independence stage                                                             54

3.5            State creation stage                                                                     56

3.6            Militancy and armed confrontation                                               60

Reference:                                                                                   63

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1            Assessment of amnesty programme in Niger Delta       `                65

4.2            Summary and conclusion                                                             86

4.3            Recommendation                                                                         88

Reference                                                                                    95

Bibliography                                                                                97

CHAPTER ONE

1.0            INTRODUCTION

1.1     HISTORICAL BACKGROUNG

          Virtually all the native races of Africa are represented in Nigeria, hence the great diversity of her people and culture. It was in Nigeria that the Bantu and Semi Bantu, migrating from southern and central Africa, intermingled with the Sudanese. Later, other groups such as Shuwa-Arabs, the Tuaregs, and the Fulani’s, who are concentrated in the far north, entered northern Nigeria in migratory waves across the Sahara Desert. The earliest occupants of settled in the forest belt and in the Niger Delta region. Today there are estimated to be more than 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria. While no single group enjoys an absolute numeric majority, four major groups constitute 60% of the population, Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West, and Igbo in the east. Other groups include Kanuri, Binis, Ibibio, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Efik, Nupe, Tiv, and Jukun, Nigeria became an independent nation on Oct. 1, 1960, and a republic in 1963, with a federal structure and three regional governments based on the compass points of North, East, and West. A fourth region, the Midwest, was later added.

          The country’s political structure was increased to twelve states in 1967, to nineteen states in 1976, within Abuja as the new federal capital. Between 1987 & 1991, a total of eleven states were created and in 1996, six additional states were added, bringing the administrative structure of the federation to thirty-six states. Abuja, in 1976, was selected by the federal government to become the new seat of government, and in 1992, the first of four stages of this move to Abuja was launched with most of the senior government officials now in Abuja. Besides being the administrative seat of government, Abuja is a beautiful city surrounded by rolling hills, with sample mountaineering, potential. The Gwagwa Hills, Near Suleja, the Chukuku Hills, the Agwai Hills and the famous Zuma rocks are just some of the awe-inspiring manifestation of nature’s beauty in the area. Bida is a lively town, famous for its bandicrafts and colorful market, and is the principal city of the Nupe people. Bida is famous for its glass beads, cloths, silver and brass work, its carved 8-legged stools made from a single piece of wood, and decorative pottery. Bida’s market truly stands out as a traditional showcase of local commerce in Nigeria. Gurara falls is on the Gurara river in Niger State, on the road between Suleja and Minna. Particularly impressive during the rainy season, the falls span 200 meters across with a sheer drop of 30 meters, which creates a dazzling rainbow effect as the water cascades over the top into a cloud of spray below.

          The Niger Delta, an area of dense mangrove rainforest in the southern tip of Nigeria has been a centre of violent conflict for some years now. The Nigeria government, like a doctor, has over 50 years tried to solve the problem in the region. During the colonial era the will link commission was set up following the agitation by the minority over what they saw as imbalance in political and economic structure of Nigeria. In 1962 the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was set up to serve in advisory capacity and provide government with information that would lead to the alleviation of the plight of the area in conjunction with the development Act of 1960’s and the Late 1980’s. Nothing significant was done to solve the developmental problems of the Niger Delta. In 1989, the military government of General Ibrahim Babaginda, in an attempt to assuage the fear of the people of the Niger Delta, set up to the oil minerals production Areas Development Commission (OMPADC) but failed to actualize its objectives due to wastefulness and corruption. During the Obasanjo’s administration, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 with the sole mandate of developing the oil rich in Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria. Like (OMPADEC) a magnifying lens will be needed to see its performance.

          This has made by federal Government to create a new ministry called the ministry of Niger Delta in 2008, to address the Niger Delta issue, in spite of the presence of these institutions, militant activities, violence and rebellion which portray a looming civil war have been the order of the day in the region. This has resulted in the military approach to ensuring peace in the area, using the joint military force (JTF). The military approach has not been successful in bringing peace to the region. In pursuance of the seven point Agenda, the federal government inaugurated a technical committee headed by Ledum Mittee on September 8, 2008 to distill the various reports, suggestions and recommendations. On the Niger Delta from the Willinks Commission Report of 1958 to the present and give summary of the recommendation. The militant commission was to come up with short medium and long term solutions to the problems in the Niger Delta and make any other recommendation that will help to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental securing in the Niger Delta region. On December 1, 2008, the report was submitted to President Yar’Adua and the assured the nation that the crises in the region would be finally resolved. Following the report of this committee, the federal government is presently pursuing the policy of Amnesty for militants as solution to the Niger Delta Crisis. Since the efforts of the federal Government and multinational corporation to get the Niger Delta out of the shackles of underdevelopment violence and rebellion have been a mirage it becomes pertinent that a closer attention be given to the root causes of the problem.

The Amnesty programme which is one of the recommendations of the mittee committee report is based on the need to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger-Delta region. This sentiment was expressed by the chairman of the Amnesty implementation panel, General Godwin Abbe (RTD) that the goal of the Amnesty programme is to achieve peace, reconciliation, reintegration, healing and sustainable development in the trouble region of Niger-Delta. The Niger-Delta has suffered various forms of hardships and injustee over the years resulting to violence and destruction of lives and properties. Amoda expressed the view that the amnesty approach to security, polities and conflict is a legal approach and asserts that amnesty is a general pardon of offence by government, a deliberate over looking of offences against a government. To pardon is to release the criminally culpable from the just punishment of the law, it is to cancel or not to exact punishment due for the offence committed. This is the nature of the relationship assumed by the government between it and the Niger Delta militants. The militants are pardoned instead of being punished. Based on this conception, the amnesty is conceived out of the need to prevent insurgent who ought to have been punished for engaging in criminal activities from facing the wrath of the law in other to roster peace and progress in Niger Delta region.

1.2            STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The Niger Delta area of Nigeria had been prone to many conflicts arising from agitation for resource control to self determination. A major problem is that the various agitation and conflicts have criminalized the area such that there exist many factors and groups each claming to represent the interest of the people in the area. While the struggles fought by the various ethnic militants groups formed by the aggrieved citizens and youths of the areas on behalf of the people of the area and to force the government to recognize their needs and demands can be accepted as a legitimate option when conditional and other legitimate avenues have been closed by government’s insensitivity to their plights and demands, the recent form which the struggles have taken delegitimize the struggles.

Sabotage of oil pipelines, assassinations, kidnappings, arson and burning of police states, attacks on government’s building and other installations have criminalized the struggles thereby leading to the government declaring them criminals. However, the civilian government of Yar’Adua in a bid to bring sanity to the area and to show government’s concern, have offered the militants amnesty. Amnesty, therefore had been used as a means of conflict resolution. How far can this go in actually resolving the problem in the Niger Delta area? This is the major issue which this project intend to look at deeply.

1.3            OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this research are as follows.

a.       To examine the problems militating the developing of Niger Delta region.

b.      To examine the prospects of peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty granted the militants by the federal government.

c.       To examine the measures taken by the federal Government in meeting the immediate and future needs of the militants that are granted Amnesty.

1.4            SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The importance of the Niger Delta to the nation cannot be overemphasized. In the terms of man, money and materials that the conflict is causing Nigeria may never be rightly quantified. Thus, all have agreed that the conflict had to be resolved urgently so that peace can return to the region. Therefore, when the government announced its policy of granting the militants a reprieve through an amnesty, there was a collection sign of relieve. The significance of this study, is that it proposes to assess and by so doing to also evaluate the effectiveness of the government’s amnesty policy and to profer suggestions that could make the policy workable.

1.5            METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The methodology used in this research is basically based on secondary data which are derived from such secondary sources as journals, magazines, reports, governments publications and statements, bulletins, critical, and  textbook, libraries, and internal extracts.

1.6            SCOPE OF STUDY

This study is scope to examining the impact of the amnesty programme as both to policy and strategy of conflict resolution and how far it can possibly resolve the fundamental problems faced by the people of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

1.7            CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Attempt is made in this section to clarify some of the key terms and concepts used in this study research work.

AMNESTY

          Amnesty is a situation in which a government agrees not to punish or to no longer punish people who have committed a particular crime against the state. A period of time during which people can give something illegal such as weapons to someone in authority or can admit that they have been involved in something illegal without been punished. The Amnesty already presented to repentant militants in the Niger Delta region is a pactage that includes rehabilitation and capacity-building programme to equip the militants with necessary skills for reintegration into various industries.

NIGER DELTA

          The Niger Delta is in the south-south geographical zone of Nigeria. This area covers a geographical distance of approximately 85,000 square kilometers are along the coast and stretches in land forming its delta estuary, Niger Delta is the third largest wetland in the world and cover an area of over 70,000 square kilometers comprising sandy coastal ridge barriers and brackish or saline mangrove.

CONFLICT

          According to Morton conflict exists where incompatible activities occur an action that is incompatible with another action prevent obstruct interferes eliminations or in some way make the later less likely to be effective.

SUSTAINABLE PEACE

          Sustainable peace and development can be seen as the desire to uphold honor and stand all outstanding memorandum of understand (M.O.U) treaties and peaceful treaties resources enter into parties (in the past and present) by various parties to bring about calmness quietness and freedom of all sort. However there cannot be sustainable peace without first resolving, conflict that have arise in both and present hence it is only if and when this is done that there can be sustainable peace and development to this very end, development can be define as multi-dimensional process that normally can change from a less to a more desirable state.

          Development as a concept has provoked debates by scholars. Some see it purely economic terms, others view development as encompassing every aspect of peoples lives. Prof Ojo defined development as the manifestation of change in the distinctive character of a phenomenon, resulting in qualitative and quantitative improvement in the nature and condition of the phenomenon.

REFERENCES

Aboribo, R.O and Umukoro N. Conflict of Globalization and the Globalization of Niger Delta Conflict in Nigerian Sociological Review. Vol. (2008) p. 21

Ake, C. Political Economic of Nigeria, Lagos, Longman (1985) p. 14

Adekanye, J. Conflict Prevention & Early Warning systems in Wohigemnth L. Common security and civil society in Africa (ed). Oslo. Peace Research Institute (1999) p. 9

Agbese, D. The curse of oil, Newswatch, vol. 17 No 4. January 25 (1993).

Aluko, M.A.O Social Dimension & Consequences of Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Suggestions for the next millemium in Osuntokun, A. Environmental problems of the Niger Delta, Lagos Friendrich Ebert Foundation (1999).

Aboribo R.O and Umukoro N. Op Cit. p. 61

Aboribo R.O and Umukoro N. Ibid p.5

Ake, C. OP. cit. pp 6-7

Adekanye, J. OP. Cit. p. 6-1

Duruigbo E. The World Bank, Multinational oil Corporations, and the Resources Curse in Africa University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic law. 26/1 (2005) p. 10

Aboribo R.O and Umukoro N. Op. Cit p. 16

Aboribo Ibid. p.3

Ekekwe, E. Class and State in Nigeria. Lagos Macmillan Nigeria (1986) p. 2aaA9

Ekekwe Ibid. pp. 8-11

Ojo S.O. Crisis in Niger Delta paper presented in political science department. Ambrose Alli University Ekpoma.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1  LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

          Conflict, by definition is an inevitable part of human existence. However conflict is not inevitable and as such is anomaly conflict is defined as the pursuit of incompatible interest and goals by different groups. Armed conflict is the resort to the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and particular interest and goals. The worst forms armed conflict include. Mass murder and genocide against unarmed civilians.

          It is possible to argue that conflict is regularly found among human relationship and societies. As Zartman has observed, conflict is the result of interaction among people, an unavoidable choices and decision and an expression of the basic fact of human interdependence. The realist school views human interaction as taking place within a power arena with possession of power which is a scarce resource engendering frustration in the one who does not possess or denied it. In this respect, Coser has argued that conflict occurs when two or more people engage in a struggle over values and claims to status power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. Coser further explained that conflict emerges whenever one party perceives that one or more valued goals are threatened or hindered by another party or parties or by their activities. The threats occur especially if both parties are seeking to expand into the same physical field of influence. Consonant with this Stagner has observed that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always suggests the existence of frustration which always lead to some form of conflict from the viewpoint, it may be possible to consider conflict as a social necessity and an inevitable aspect of the healthy functioning of all societies.

          Conflict can be said to be endemic to Africa and African states even though we do not concour with the view of a wild savage Africa locked in primordial struggle between races, tribes and ethnic groups as the apologists of colonialism would want us to believe but more realist is the fact that Africa as a whole was subjected to colonialism which as fanon as argued is neither a thinking machine nor a body endowed with reasoning facilities. It is violence in its natural state Coleman had also argued that early nationalism at least in Nigeria was expressed through revolts provoked by the imposition and operation of colonialism. The various attempts art restructuring the traditional forms of political and economic systems with a view of meeting the primary needs of the metropolis had been possible with the assistance of the colonial army. These new forms and structures of colonial rule were imposed through violence and repression which therefore becomes an integral part of the colonial administrative system. Thus, there existed an antagonistic relationship between the colonialists and the colonizers and so early nationalist resistance assumed a violent character. So by resorting to violence, the early nationalists did not initiate any new claim of violent acts but were merely breaking the existing monopoly. As Fanon viewed it the violence of the colonized is an act of emancipation. Huntington modernization and violence seemed to have confirmed this view. His argument in the main is that colonialism and ethnic heterogeneity would seem to be much better predictors of violence than poverty and that it is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produces political disorder.

          Ethnic conflict also ensured as a result of disagreement over communities boundaries. As a matter of fact many intra-state conflicts assumed this character. As Nnoli has also noted this type of communal conflict over territories and communal boundaries assumes the proportions it does basically because a communal group is one in which primary identity prevails. Membership of the group is not attained but ascribed. Within the communal group the individual self is defined holistically. The totality of the involvement in life is defined by the group example communal groups include family, ethnic, religious or regional groups. Within the social community or group there is a sense of belonging as well as the fact that the individual can only have a sense of self-realization and self affirmation within the collectivity. Hence a perceived injustice to any member is viewed as applying to the whole community and it becomes quite easy to ethnic or communal sentiments of retribution against another ethnic communal group resulting to conflict and wars between communities. As Nnoli has further said this sense of community oneness is further reinforced by a shared history of collective achievement suffering and deprivative which in turn increases the sentiments of feelings of uniqueness and group solidarity.

          Omowe’s view on resources and mineral rights as a basis for conflict is not new in all societies, develop or underdeveloped. Indeed there is hardly any society that has not be challenged by this reality. Over the years this has led to agitation and ownership rights, tenure security and management of land and its resources. The current wave of agitations in the Niger-Delta is therefore not unexpected nor lack possible explanation in the West African sub-region such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and even elsewhere like Congo, Angola, Zaire e.t.c. contention and agitations over environmental rights have not just been protracted and complex but have registered enormous bloodased.

          Nowhere within the Nigeria federation has the quest for environmental right been more acute and chaotic as in the oil producing communities of the Niger-Delta, a region that is one of the largest wetlands in the world. From pre-colonial times to date the region has transited from one economic transition crisis to another without much pain such that the change over from slave trade to palm oil trade even with US manifest attractions and accompanying profits for participations visited point on the generality of the people. The last transition from palm oil to crude oil which threw up environmental and Ecological concerns is therefore linked to the present scarce for environmental right. Indeed the Niger Delta has been a visible threat of war pitching local and ill equiped forces of resistance on the one hand, the conspiratorial dual multi-national partners state and allies on another. Thus, overtime the core and conflictual issues threatening the peace of the region remain the quest for the control of mineral environmental rights of the people. The pre-colonial agitation pitched Jaja of Opobo, king Koko of Nembe, King Nana of Itsekiri kingdom and king Kosoko of Lagos against the forces of global capital represented by the British. Commonly manifest is the linkage and trend in all the incidents of notable rebellions region of environmental resources rights. So a visible thread link the jaga-Nana-Koko era to the present. This  was acknowledged by Onoge thus:

There is a linkage in all the agitation in the region: from the Isaac Boro resistance agitation for State creation in the first and second republics Governor Ambrose Alli of defunct Bendel State litigation against the federal government as the derivation principle of revenue allocation, Ken Sarowiwa’s movement for the survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP) and the current agitation for resource control and fiscal federalism.

          The colonial origin and background of these agitation according to Tamuno was made possible through the bringing together of diverse nationalities and economic modes at various levels of development by the Nigerian colonial state. Obi has also argued that central to the issue of minority environmental rights is the paradoxical contradiction of majority-minority relationship that pitched the numerically superior Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba tripod against other ethnic nationalities that constitute the minorities. This is further compounded by the reality that the so called minorities produce much of what keeps the state going while the majority supervises, appropriates and distributes the gains there from without consideration to where the wealth is derived. It is this seeming alienation and exclusion that underpins the quest for environmental rights and justice in Nigeria. The colonial patrimonial favour the majority groups and their elites were integrated into the system of colonial spoils. This explains why marginalized minorities began to ask for self determination as a way of protecting themselves from further domination and oppression. It was in the context of the above that the minorities demand for their own state within the Nigerian federation and threatened separation or succession when they were ignored initially.

          The new strategies of conflicts in the region are mainly spear headed by the so called militants and mercenaries that have added a new complexion to the struggle. Combating these gangs and mercenaries is an on-going project that has interrogated the capacity and capability of the state to protect her citizens but more significantly, the militant gangs and mercenaries have added to the states difficulty in meeting international energy demands especially minored from the perspective of prices and the security of suppliers. With respect to the above, it is rather safe to affirm that the groups are holding Nigeria economic and political destiny to ransom. In analyzing the role of groups engaged in the advancement of the rights of the region, several names and categorization have been ascribed to these groups that promote the new strategies of conflict. In the early years of the struggle, the militant groups were categorized as “cult groups” at war in the region especially in the riverine areas and creeks notable Buguma and Okirika, the birth places of Tom Ateke of Niger Delta vigilantee force (NDPVUF) and ALhaji Asari Dokubo of the Niger Delta people volunteer force (NDPVF). Later to “militant” in Nigeria and “insurgents” by the international community. These categorization especially by the state were indeed political, essentially meant to deflect local and international attention from the persisting conflicts and the militarization of the region. However, what has remained silent and treated in hashed tones and whispers remain that the so called “gangs” were the disgruntled and disaffected military/youth wing of the ruling people Democratic Party (PDP) that broke away from the grip and control of the party.

          Thus, the “gangs” allege that they were used and dumped by the politicians without proper remuneration and “settlement” after the 2003 general election. The groups, having detached themselves from the grip and control of politicians especially on the state level decided to busy themselves and queried the sincerity of the politicians in the professed desire to reverse the poor living conditions of the slum-dwellers of the region. In a sense therefore, the groups, see themselves as freedom fighters. All the same, Adejumobi has described the “militants” As:

Youth based groups formed with the purpose of promoting and protecting the parochial interest of their ethnic groups, and whose activities sometimes involves the use of violence. Ethnic militant groups in Nigeria are not rebel movement they serve as social pressure groups that seek to influence the structure of power in the country, and call attention to deteriorating material condition or social environment.

          As the groups made profits from their endeavours in the creeks they re-channeled and ploughed the profits into the large-scale purchase of small arms and light weapons (SALWS). This irreversibly led to the emergence and growth of private military companies (PMC^S) employed by the state, businessmen, politicians and ultimately the militants in the creek. In the ensuring confusion, the arms were used to confront the state-oil Truck alliance in the region. The two weeks of mayhem that pitched the Nigerian army personnel against a  multiplicity gang in Port-Harcourt in August, 2007 has revealed the complex nature of the ongoing crisis. The difficulty, experienced by the security forces in quelling the uprising is really symptomatic of the sophistication of these groups. Their sophistication seem quite pronounced as the militants introduced new lethal weapons like: rocked-propelled grenades (RPGS) Kalashnikov AK-47 machine guns, satellite phones and information technology (IT), speed boats etc.

          These groups have been ruthlessly effective because there is a growing pan Niger-Delta consciousness in making their claims beyond inter-ethnic divisions which has reduced the impact of state-oil divisiveness and politics of carrots and stick inducements in the region. The solidarity between the groups perhaps derived from the report of the Niger-Delta peoples conference in the 1999 constitution, held at Port-Harcourt. Ojefia thus posit that:

The organizational forms, the scale of mobilization and the specific agendas canvassed by the protest groups have changed according to the historical circumstances, but the common striving for equity and autonomous space is unmistakable.

          The unity of purpose and the ethnic origin of some of these groups could be gleaned from several rights, charters and communiqués documented and produced by the several ethnic nationalities. This includes the Ogoni Bill of rights of 1990, the Kaima Declaration of the Ijaws, Oron Bill of rights, Aklaka Declaration of the Egi, Warri Accord, Resolutions of the first Urhobo Economic summit, the Ikwere Declaration and several others. They all signpost and justify the basis of their struggle for self determination and resource control for each of the nationalities. The Ikwere Rescue Charter puts it more succinctly that:

We express our solidarity with all oppressed peoples in Nigeria in their struggle for justice and equity, practicably the Ogonis, the Ijaws, the Ogbas, the Etches, the Ekpeyes, the Igbos, the Urhobos, the Itsekiri, and Isokos.

The ethnic nationalities that initially spurned the actions of these groups thereafter provided the needed support base for these groups. The seeming support of these ethnic nationalities for their militant groups weakened the possibilities of identifying and eliminating the militants by the state. This therefore made the successful implementation of the new forms or strategies of conflict a success. Thus, the groups engaged in damaging oil facilities, terrorizing international oil workers, a combined impact of which led to the reduction of barrels of oil meant for export especially from March, 2006 (Terrorism monitor). The fear injected into the energy sector by the activities of the purveyors of this new form of conflict compelled oil servicing firms to reject first contracts in the Niger Delta but prefer such contracts from Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and other states in the gulf of Guinea such as Sao Tome and principle that is a member of the Joint Development zone (JDZ).

          In the ranging conflict, the NDPVF spear-headed the implementation of the new forms of conflict by demanding first that more energy-benefits be distributed to the populations of the region. The failure of this demand to attract the positive response from oil-state alliance led to the regular laying of Siege to oil facilities and kidnapping of oil-workers to extract concessions from the government and the oil TNC. As the militant tightened the noose on the Delta, Muhajeed Asari Dokubo asserted that:

There is nothing wrong if I take the crude oil found in our land, refine it and sell it to our people at NGN’s per litre. The real bunkerers are the federal government which has been steeling oil from Ijaw land.

The arrest and charging to court of Asari-Dokubo for treasonable offences in September 2005 caused a hull to set in until on the 11^th January 2006, when a new group called movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) Registered itself in the consciousness of the public. They indeed increased and intensified the act of kidnapping by attacking an offshore platform belonging to shell and taking hostage of oil workers. In announcing responsibility over the act, MEND demand that shell should comply with a court order and a senate directive that (Shell) should pay the sum of $1.5 billion to local communities. They also called for the unconditional release of Asari-Dokubo and the impeached but detained ex-governor of Bayelsa State D.S.P Alamieyeseigha ever since, MEND have repeatedly kidnapped oil workers, bombed target areas and killed military officers in the region. Specifically, MEND detonated a bomb at the Bori Military Camp/Cantonment and did the same to the oil truck termmal in the Warri refinery. Thereafter, several other acts inimical to the state have been carried out by MEND.

          Yet, MEND is not done in their action. They have been brazenly supported and complimented by the activities of the federation of Niger-Delta Ijaw communities (FNDIC) that operate in the Western flanks of the Delta. In February, 2007, they took hostage about 24 Filipinos travelers on aboard a Brawal Cargo ship. By so doing, the militants have succeeded in etching themselves on the consciousness of the international community as energy supplies and prices have systematically suffered. In response, several international security/economic co-operation arrangements has emerged. This includes but not restricted to the Nigeria-US arrangement that keeps the US marines about 150 miles off the Delta coast. Curiously, just as the incarceration of Asari-Dokubo caused a hull in the activities of his increase in 2007 by the Yar’Adua’s government sparked off a wave of kidnapping that bordered on criminality. This criminality theory seem plausible because, prior to this time, only foreign oil workers were at the receiving end of the action of the so called “freedom fighter’s” nut by early and mid-2007, the wave of kidnapping and sundry terrorist acts turned the heat on children (toddlers) of the rich, mothers of supposedly rich government officials of Niger-Delta extraction. It was therefore reasoned that the new wave do not in any way represent in any guise the action of “Freedom Fighters”. Thus, lacking in kindness but deeply in love with ransom taking, the criminality associated with the prevailing wave of kidnapping is unmistakable. And the military offensive to flush out the “cultists that besieged Port-Harcourt in August 2007 simply reveal the rivalry between the old kingpins of the revolutionary Niger-Delta struggle notably Ateke Tom and the recently released Asari Dokubo, believed to have been compromise and the new henchmen that have thrown off the Yoke of the old Brigade when the former were in chains. The new henchmen such as Soboma George etc were schooled by the old brigade but the former having tasted the sweetness of power when their bosses were “away” swore not to relinquish power whenever they return, no matter what. The determination of the brigade to cut to size the over-bearing influence, of the new breed led to the Mayhem in Port-Harcourt before the development of soldiers. This was the setting that was referred to the media and government circles as “gang war” or “cult-war” in the garden city.

          Therefore violence becomes the most visible and the ultimate weapon of collective contentious action. History is replete of violence perpetrated by various contentious social movements against those perceived as enemies. Violence in this respect serves two purposes. First as “the easiest form of collective action for isolated, illiterate and enrage people to initiate” and second, as used by larger movement, it serves as a means of welding “supporters together, humanize opponents and demonstrate a movement’s prowess”. Violence is interactive at least to the extent that “repressive forces do the largest part of the killing and wounding, while the groups (social movement) they are seeking as a method of expression has a polarizing effect. It transforms contentions from a confused, many-sided games of allies enemies and bystanders into a bipolar one by creating a clear cut division among groups, forcing people to choose sides and dividing them into supporters/activists and repressive apparatus. The adoption of violence as a method of articulating and convening grievance to the state is a major power source of social movements but at the same time it can turn into a liability especially when potential allies become frightened after adoption of violence as a medium of expression and abandoned the cause.

          Gurr has distinguished between political violence and other types of violence. He defined political violence as “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors-including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies. Political violence is subsumed under “forces”, the use or threat of violence by any party  to attain ends within or outside the political order. Gurr further argued that political violence “theoretically pose a threat to the political system in two sense: they challenge the monopoly of force imputed to the state in political theory, and in functional terms, they are likely to interfere with and, if severe, to destroy normal political processes”. Gurr sketched the causal progression of political violence as starting from the development of discontent, progressing to politicization of the discontent and if not quickly addressed will lead to the actualization of violence action against political object and actors. Gurr in arguing for the why political violence linked it with discontent which arises as a result of a perception of relative deprivation and this is what instigates people into collective violence. In this case, relative deprivation is seen as a “perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Valued capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them”.

          However it is very instructive to note that the adoption of repressive actions by the state actors to contain all contention is a function of the fact that political elites who have been successful in employing violence to quell revolts and defend their claims to power eventually become habituated to the political uses of violence. Their acceptance of violence as a means of resolving disputes or people becomes part of the elite political culture. In this respect this culture has been borrowed from the period of military dictatorship which had spawned President Obasanjo.

METHOD OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

          Conflict resolution scholar have argue that conflict has an ontological basis in human needs, and it is the denial which causes violent conflicts, or causes unre-solvable differences to degenerate into armed violence or armed conflict. The conception of conflict, its management and resolution have led to terms such as peacemaking, conflict prevention, third party intervention and the focus on mediation and negotiation, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, peace enforcement and peace building. Conflict analysis, a critical investigation into the root, secondary and tertiary causes of conflict, highlighting the actors, structures and dynamics in conflict situations, is important in determining intervention mechanisms, and the management and resolution of conflict, conflict prevention describe the whole range of development and crisis intervention efforts of reconcile parties and groups with incompatible interest, and to prevent the pursuit of divergent goals from degenerating into armed violence. Also, when the pursuit of irreconcilable differences and interest escalate into armed conflict and is resolved, the efforts and intervention strategies is prevent relapse into further violence is described as conflict prevention. The management of conflict using peaceful, non-violence method has been around for a longtime. In nearly all African societies, there is a preference for the peaceful settlement of disputes along the lines prescribed by the institutions and values of the community. Violence is normally frowned at. In a few instances where it may be tolerated, the community rather than the individuals has to be the sanctioning authority.

          In all civilized societies of the world, there is growing resort to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The image of violence presented by the media is not, as such, a true reflection of the dominant method of setting conflict situations. There is an enormous amount of peaceful and non-violent settlement of disputes taking place at various levels and in many communities all over the world, most of which do not catch the attention of the media.

          A wide range of non-violent methods managing conflict avail to the conflict transformation world. These methods are available at the individual, family, group, community and international levels. The peaceful methods exist in two broad categories. The first is the proactive category which entails methods that aim to prevent the occurrence of conflict in the first instance. Example include undocumented community based trust and confidence building measures, communication, good governance, inter party collaboration, etc. the second category is reactive, dealing with responses to situations, that have already turned conflicts, or are potentially so. These include the third party interventions like median, brokerage, conciliation, arbitration and integration, etc the objective of this chapter is not only to present these methods in the conflict management (which as a matter of fact have been with us for long) but also to stress that there are alternatives to violence, aggression and confrontation. Furthermore, the Africa Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) will be used as an example that in Africa, there is structures and procedures for non-violent transformation of conflict. To begin with let us clarify some basic terms.

          Conflicts resolution is seen by Miller as a “variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflict. Mialetal indicate by conflict resolution, it is expected that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed hostile, while the structure of the conflict has been changed. Mitchell and Banks use conflict resolution to refer to:

i.        An outcome in which the issues in a existing conflict are satisfactorily dealt with through a solution that is mutually acceptable to the partners, self-sustaining in the long run and productive of a new, positive relationship between parties that were previously hostile adversaries.

ii.       Andany process by which such an outcome is achieved.

          Some people may use the term “conflict resolution” to refer to a specialized field of study and practice as in the field of conflict resolution. Putting these ideas together, it can be said that in principle, conflict resolution connotes a sense of finality, where parties to a conflict are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a settlement and the conflict is resolved in a true sense. Some conflicts, especially those over resources, are permanently resolvable. From the point of view  a conflict is resolved when the basic needs of parties have been met with necessary satisfiers, and their fears, have been allayed. Others like those over values, maybe non-resolvable and can at best transform, regulated or managed.

2.2     THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

          The study shall adopt two theoretical framework and these are the social movement theory and the conflict/frustration Aggression theory.

          Definitions have been advanced regarding the concepts of social movement. A social movement has been defined as “a collective enterprise to establish new order of life”. A social movement emerged either to prevent a social change. Social movements, therefore a “large-scale, widespread collective action in pursuit of objectives that affect and shape the social order in some fundamental way. Medearis sees social movements as “collective challenges mounted by relatively marginal group against powerful elites and dominant, ideologies”. The import of the definitions above is that social movements have two main objectives.

a.       To change the society from what it has been to something new, apparently because, the old order is no longer benefiting the majority.

b.      To resist change because there is a strong feeling that contain aspects of society should not be destroyed.

Social movements have also been viewed as a “collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change in the society.

          Before a social movement occurs, certain conditions needs to be present. These conditions are: Structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized belief, precipitating factor, mobilization of social participants and social control. By structural conduciveness, we mean that the society as presently constituted has certain inherent problems which are capable of generating discontent. Such factors include existence of several groups with conflicting interest, different political, religious, ethnic and professional interest. The logic here is simple, social movements are more likely to occur in a multi-ethnic society than in a society where there is ethnic homogeneity, structural strain refers to failure in the working of a society where there is ethnic  working of a society in such a way that it lead to intense dissatisfaction. When certain organs in society are failing in the performance of their functions, there is like hood that crisis is inevitable. This situation can lead to intense hardship and difficulty to the extent the violence becomes unstoppable. Political and economic institutions or organs of any society are easily prove to crisis, thereby creating instability for a social movement to occur, people are able to identify the sources of strain. Apart from this, there should be some agreement among the populace that the problem is bad enough to warrant change. Somethings threatening the well-being of members of the society could warrant the eruption of social movement. It is a situation which leads to crisis in such a way that the whole society is thrown into confusion. There is also the issue of mobilization of social participations. Members must be fully resolved to confront the problem in its entirely. If members are not able to do this, the movement may not succeed. Lastly, social control needs to be in place in order to guide the conduct of people, and keep them focused, otherwise the objectives of the movement may not be realized.

          Social movements have a number of variants. The common ones are: reactionary movement, conservative movements, reformist movement, revolutionary movement and escape movements. Societies experience social change so that old values and behaviour patterns fade away. They wish is to return to the good old days when people know that was right and good and behave accordingly. A conservative movement seeks to conserve the present-day values and acceptable behaviour from the dangers of social change. Conservatives seek to maintain the status-quo.

          Reformist movements accepts much of the present structure and values of society. Reformist movements usually are organized for the improvement of one thing or another. While the reformist desire reform, they do not desire to destroy the existing social order as a whole. Attitudes values and behaviour are all drastically changed from the old to the new. Social movements that are called escape movements are not attempting to deal with the present social order. Instead, the member of escape movements seek to remove themselves from society.

          When youth action is seen as a form of contentious politics, popular perception of the youths and youth revolt as ill-informed, irrelevant, instructured and largely episodic expression of violence become erroneous. Alienated from society, youth, along with other marginal or subalterns mostly embark on what Tarrow has termed contentious politics or contentious collective action defined as:

          Collective action embarked upon by people who lack regular access to institutions who act in the wine of new or unacceptable claims and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities.

          Social movements are important to the sustenance of contentious politics because:

a.       Their ideological principle are essentially a diverse range of beliefs, ideas and values that is dominantly radical in terms of relations to existing one.

b.      They pursue goals that often relate to reforms and change

c.       The equation and claims they pursue often stem or emanate from grievances and social discontent against dominant practices behaviour and conduct in the political economy such as exclusion, marginality and inequity.

d.      They are often populist and embrace a non-format, non-institutional, grass root politics or mass politics. Is often comprises the popular forces of youth and woman groups, poor student, artisans, and so on. It’s a politics is that from below.

e.       They usually construct a platform for action and change. They create and work through an array of local, national and international linkages, networks and alliances between numerous grouping and organizations. Their actions involve co-operation, collaboration, complementarily and mutual support between individuals, groups and organizations, pursuance of agenda and claims.

THE CONFLICT/FRUSTRATION-AGGRSSION THEORY

          Social scientists argue that conflict is in inherent feature of group existence. Conflict usually occur in the process of individuals or groups pursuit of divergent interest, goals and aspirations. Conflicts may be defined as a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resource in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desire values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. Conflicts are normal processes of interaction particularly in complex and plural societies such a Nigeria and other places in the world.

          Proponents of the conflict/frustration-aggression theory drew their premise from the above. In an attempt to explain aggression, scholars point to the difference between what people feel they went or deserve to what they actually get “want-get-ratio” and differences between “expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction.

          This is the central argument that Ted Robert Gurr’s Relative Deprivation thesis which stipulates that the greater the discrepancy, however, marginal between what is sought and what seem attainable, the greater will be the chances that anger and violence will result.

          The main explanation that the conflict/frustration-aggression theory provides is that aggression is not just undertaken as a natural reaction or instinct but that it is the outcome of frustration and that in a situation where the legitimate desires of individual is denied either direct or indirect.

            In situation where feelings of frustration become widespread among the population and the feeling is that people are getting less than they deserve, the most advisable thing that political leaders can do is to find out what the expectation of such individuals and groups are and to seek ways of negotiating with them. Most times, however, those in a position of authority believe that giving into public demands or entering into negotiations is a sign of weakness. This is not the cases and sometimes, the fact that an official of the state or community leaders is showing some concern is enough to make people believe that something is being done.

            From the above theories, it is obvious that ethnic militias conveniently fall into the category of social movements that are out to address their objective state of condition in the society. Also, a good example of the way in which frustration lead to aggression can be seen in the ongoing crisis in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria. After waiting and peacefully agitating for what the people of the region considered a fair share of the oil wealth that is exploited from their land, youths now take the law into their own hands by vandalizing oil pipelines, kidnapping oil workers for the ransoms and general creating problems for those they believe are responsible for predicaments.

REFERENCES

Zartman, W.I. (1991), Conflict resolution in Africa, Washington DC, the Bookings Institute.

Coser, L, The function of social conflict, New York, Glencoe Hill Press.

Ibid p8

Stagner, R, the psychology of human conflict in Elton, B.M (ed) The nature of human conflict, Engle wood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall (1995) P. 14

Fanton, Niger-Delta Environment, Ogui Crisis and the State in the constitution.

Coleman Beyond Ethnic Militas: Re-constructing the Nigeria State, in Babawale, T. (ed) Urban violence, Ethnic militas and the challenge of Democratic Consolidation, in Nigeria, Lagos Malthouse press (2003), p. 12.

Huntngton, S.P Political order in changing societies, New Haven, Yale University press (1972) p. 12

Nnoli, O. Communal Conflicts and Population Displacement: An Introduction “In Nnoli, O. (ed). Communal conflict and population Displacement, Enugu, PACREP (2003) p. 9

Omowe, D.A., the State, land and resource Rights and the prospects of sustainable development in West Africa, paper presented at the 2^nd workshop of Pan Africa programme in land and resource Rights, Lagos: 15-16 July (2002) p. 32.

Omowe, D.A Ibid. p. 26

Ukaogo, V.O, from palm oil to crude oil: The impact of international Trade on Niger-Delta communities, 1895-1995, A Doctoral thesis submitted to the post Graduate School, University of Lagos (2007). P. 34

Onoge Omafume “Political leadership and struggle for the Transformation and Development of the Niger-Delta Discussion Note, paper presented at the seminar on Niger-Delta and federalism. Quoted in Ojefia, I………..

Tamuno, T, Separatist Agitation in Nigeria since 1914, Journal of modern Africa Studies (1970)

Obi, C, Oil, Environmental conflict and natural security in Nigeria. Ramification of the Ecology-security Nexus for Sub-Regional peace, ACDS Occasional paper University of Illinois at urban Champaign (1997) p. 41

Obi. C, Ibid 8.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1     THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE NIGER-DELTA

          The nature and the form which the struggle and conflict in the Niger-Delta has taken this far. Conflict within this area can actually be traced from the struggle with colonialists and slave traders till date. In this respect therefore, the dimensions of the conflict which started as peaceful protestations to armed struggle has also passed through attempts at peaceful negotiations to a call for restructuring of the federal structure through the democratic process of sovereign National conference and where all these failed to armed struggle to enforce self determination. An explanation of the various stages or dimensions which the struggle has gone through is what this chapter proposes to do.

          A major discerning feature of most social movements especially in Africa revolves around the struggle for recognition, inclusion and more importantly rights as a social ethnic group. The relevance and place of human rights as a sina qua non for peace has been the subject of many recent studies (Galting, Osaghe, Mahajan, and Chandra). The denial of human rights has been seen to inequality, injustice, discrimination, exclusion and domination. wherever human rights have been denied, it has always been a precipitant of conflict and violence. However, it is important to situate the present struggle in the Niger-Delta within a historical context, the social basis of the various movements, how the different constituencies of demands and interests are mobilized, why the social movements emphasized certain demands or rights as against others, all these will have to be done within an analysis of the Nigeria state and its engagement of social movements. Social movements in the Niger-Delta have metamorphosed into militant groups organized around the disaffections and grievances which have evolved around issues of oil politics and the determination of groups in the area to optimize the political and material benefits derivable from the resource environmental problems and the struggle for environmental justice, minority rights and other empowering and emancipatory rights. Osaghae has argued that there are at least four distinct phases of the struggle.

3.2     THE PRECOLONIAL STAGE/PHASE

          Although the Niger-Delta community had not evolved at this time, the phase of the struggle can be traced to the pre-colonial period and the resistance to colonial incursion by the Ijaws and the Itsekiris. the two most powerful trading groups whose leaders, Jaja of Opobo and Nana respectively,  sought to protect their economic rights, interest and privileges. Early records of conflicts in the Niger-Delta arose from disagreements over trade give the prevailing economic transition that evidenced the changes over from human traffic to legitimate commerce and within the epoch of legitimate trade the transition from palm oil to crude oil. From the consular period that ushered in the area of gun-boat diplomacy, forms of conflict emerged in the region, as response to the perceived high-handiness of the British authorities. Thus, from the assault and annexations of Lagos, to the several pacification expenditures mounted by the hegemony-seeking British authorities, the natives have usually responded with their peculiar style of local resistance measured to cripple the smooth operations of the foreign enterprises evidenced in the milking of the Delta. The dynamics of local resistance and conflicts thereafter gained manifestation in the kidnapping of 1895 in November and the sacking of the trade forts of the British by the local “toughies” all the behest of king Koko.

          The blocking of European traders from accessing the hinterland is yet another form of resistance in the palm oil era even as the institution of the courts of equity set up by the kind of Bonny wasto curtail the excesses of the British supercargoes. Although, the physical sacking of the British forts seemed to be an action to the extreme or overkill, the local population indeed felt that such reaction was the needed response to retain a seniblance of independence if not suzerainty of the independence of the Delta States and communities. The current spate of kidnapping of foreign oil workers does not necessarily represent a new form of conflict as presented by some scholars, many had argued that kidnapping was a new form of response or form of local resistance but it is possible to show that it is only new to the extent of its reintroduction in the crude oil epoch. This is because kidnapping as a response is not new as the 1985 Nembe raid by the British was caused by kidnapping. However, we can safely affirm that kidnapping as a strategy of conflict was merely abandoned overtime but had to be re-introduced when the rights struggles intensified. Thus, kidnapping option passed through a renewed phased as the dynamics of conflicts in the region transformed to take new shape and character. It is this transformed shaped formed shape, form and character in the present epoch of economic transition from palm oil to crude oil that I have carefully referred to as new forms of conflict.

3.3     THE COLONIAL/INDEPENDENCE STAGE

          The second phase of the struggle coincided with the period of nationalist struggle for independence. Prominent amongst the early nationalists involved in the struggle for were Ernest Okoli and Udo-Udoma. A major product of the struggle for independence was the polarization of the country along ethnic and religious lines.  The character of the struggle changed dramatically at this time. The struggle was directed against the dominant ethnic majorities that had transformed the region into internal colony. With the help of the struggle of this period provided a testing ground for the latter one. With the breakaways and splintering which characterized political parties of the early period, the Niger-Delta were also involved in creating political parties as vanguard for their struggle against dominance by other ethnic groups. These parties were the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Niger-Delta Congress (NDC) and other political associations which were geared towards opposing the Igbos and their political front, the NCNC. The hope of the minorities in the Niger-Delta for a separate identity which a state of their own could given them was dashed by the Willink (1958) report which recommended that the problems of the minorities could be solved by the introduction of appropriate political and constitutional mechanisms including the establishment of a joint federal-regional development board for the Niger-Delta, a bill of rights and centralization of the police force.

3.4     THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

          The third phase of the struggle in the Niger-Delta coincided with the post-Willink and Post-Independence period. This period saw the intensification of demand for separate state. Public attention was drawn to the struggle by the 12-day revolution led by Isaac Adaka Boro, Sam Onwunaru and Nottingham Dick in February 1966, just a few weeks before the first military coup of Nzeogwu. Among the problems catalogued were the problems of marginalization, criminal neglect of the people, degradation of the environment and the denial of our right to self-determination. Although the secessionist attempt failed, It became significant because it helped not only to intensify the struggle but also to sharply focus and narrowly defined it. The events culminating from the military incursion and ethnic problems of the 1960s which eventually led to the civil war further impacted on the struggle. The humiliation, discrimination and oppression that the people suffered from the dominant Igbos accelerated the process of ethnic identity construction and consolidation. This and the 12-day revolution caused a generational shift in the struggle as youths took over from the elders who were more inclined to negotiating for recognition of their rights and demands. The take-over by the youths made violence the only remaining option and introduced militancy and militant actions into the struggle.

4.5     STATE CREATION STAGE

          The fourth phase of the struggle covers the period of the creation in the region. From two states, Rivers and Cross River States in 1967, the number of states increased to four with the creation of Baylsa and Akwa Ibom in 1995 and a fifth one, Delta State, being the core state. This phase concretized the emergent features of the third phase, that is, the emergence and proliferation of social movement built around ethnic identities and controlled by the youths. The phase saw the identification of the government and the various oil prospecting companies as the enemies of the people and the intensification of violent actions against them in form of vandalisation of oil pipes and installations and disruption of normalcy.

          The greatest weapon available for all social movements with collective contentions behaviour is disruption. Social movements employ the power of disruption basically because this draws attention more to them. Thus, the power of disruption becomes the strongest weapon of contentious social movements. However, as Tarrow has noted, the sustenance of disruption depends on high level of commitment, on keeping authorities off balance, and on resisting the attraction of both violence and conventionalization. When faced with high level of disruption activities by social movements, the state coercive apparatus, the police and the military are brought into subdue the social movement.

          Violence therefore becomes the most visible and the ultimate weapon of collective contentious action. History is replete of violence perpetrated by various contentious social movements against those perceived as opponents or enemies. Violence in this respect serves two purposes, first as the easiest form of collective action of isolated, illiterate and enraged people to initiate and second, as used by larger movements, it serves as a means of welding supporters together dehumanize opponents and demonstrate a movement’s prowess. Violence is interactive at least to the extent that repressive forces to the largest part of the killing and wounding, while the groups (social movement) they are seeking to country do most of the damage to objects. The initial nature of violence in the Niger-Delta is reflective of this point noted by Charles Tilly where the protesting groups embarked on disruptive activities by breaking, sabotaging and destroying oil pipes and were  shot on sight by the policy and  Army.

          The use of violence as a method of expression has a polarizing effect. It transforms contentious from a confused, many-sided game of allies, enemies and bystanders into a bipolar one by creating a clear cut division among groups, forcing people to choose sides and dividing them into supporters/activitists repressive apparatus. The adoption of violence as a method of articulating and convening grievance to the state is a major power source of social movements but at the same time it can turn into a hability especially when potential allies become frightened after adoption of violence as a medium of expression and abandoned the cause.

          Gurr “(1971:3-4) has distinguished between political violence and other types of violence. He defined political violence as all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, it actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies political violence is subsumed under forces, the use or threat of violence by any party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political order. Gurr further argued that political violence theoretically pose a threat to the political system in two sense. They challenge the monopoly of force imputed to the state in political theory, and in functional terms, they are likely to interfere with and if severe, to destroy normal political processes. Gurr in arguing for the why of political violence linked it with discontent which arises as a result of a perception of relative deprivation and that this is what instigates peoples into collective violence. In this case, relative deprivation is seen as a perceived discrepancy between man’s value expectation and value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Valued capabilities are the goods and condition they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them.

          However it is very instructive to note that the adoption of repressive actions by the state actors to contain all contention is a function of the fact that political elites who have been successful in employing violence to quell revolts and defend their claims to power eventually become habituated to the political uses of violence. Their acceptance of violence as a means of resolving disputes or repressing people becomes part of the elite political culture. In this respect this culture has been borrowed from the period of military dictatorship which had spawned President Obasanjo. Gurr equally noted that elites who have secured that power and maintain their position by violent means are disposed to respond violently to future challenges. This viewed activism in democracies requires a climate of acceptance of unconventional means of political action among groups and the state. State violence will lead to employing similar repertoire by contending social movements. Violence will always beget violence.

4.6     MILITANCY AND ARMY CONFRONTATION

          The transformation, shape and character of conflicts in the Delta have ensured that pipelines vandalization, hostage taking, oil platform shut-downs, bombardments, youth-women activism and militia insurgency represent new forms of conflict in the Niger-Delta. A further transformation of the nature and character of these conflicts revealed in 2007, immediately after the release of Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the leader of Niger Delta peoples volunteer force (NDPVF) that the ongoing conflicts is not entirely a struggle for the upliftment of the standard of living of the population. Rather, the kidnapping of Nigerians such as toddlers and adults with no link to the oil industry and the demand for ransom is simply, the criminalization of the struggle and deflates the balloon of falsehood on the real intent of this new trial and character of conflicts.

          However, inspite of the obvious lacuna in argument over the real causes of the present intensification of conflicts in the region, it is common knowledge that the privatization of criminality in the Niger-Delta by “gangs” and mercenaries has direct bearing to the injustices perpetrated over time in the region. Such injustices have seen to the emergence of a long list of illiterate but active and idle men and women whose youthful energies cannot be deploy on the land/farm owing to the devastated nature of the lands. To therefore make ends meet, they engage in all manners of social misbehaviour that keeps them active but relatively resourceful. The Nigerian state has no answer to any of these problems but this is exacerbated by the peripheral role of Nigeria in international capitalism.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1            ASSSESSMENT OF AMNESTY PROGRAMME IN NIGER DELTA

A critical look at the amnesty programme of the federal government for the Niger Delta militants since October 4, 2009, the booming of guns in the creeks of the Niger Delta with their harrowing human and economic calamities have been replaced by a peaceful environment conductive for normal living and doing business.

The date is of immense importance in the history of Nigeria, being the day that armed youths in the Niger Delta, who had engaged the authorities in guerilla welfare, accepted the amnesty granted them by the late President Yar’Adua. Adopting a three-pronged approach of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), government has largely been able to remake these young men, who once swore to bring down the Nigeria state. One year after, cynics who thought it was a fruitless gesture have been proved wrong.

A notable development after the proclamation of amnesty is that economic activities in the region are on the upswing. The gains coming to the oil rich region and to the country are just too palpable to be ignored.

Major gains

Nigeria’s oil production increased from between 700,000 and 800,000 bpd to 2.3 million bpd, after oil firms resumed full operations across the Niger Delta. Hundreds of thousands of lost barrels of oil from sabotaged pipeline and flagrant theft by the militants and common criminal reduced to the bearest minimum this addiding to daily production stock. The Nigeria LNG’S reputation as a reliable supplier of LNG cargoes was equally restored.

          With renewed confidence in the international oil market Nigeria  began to exercise more influence in the simple and pricing of oil. Repairs of oil and gas infrastructure damaged during the era of militant agitation speedily commenced, almost immediately after the disbarment contractor handling developmental projects also were given way to fast-track their efforts so as to assure the ex-militant of government’s determination to ensure sustainable development in the Niger Delta. Forceful stoppage of work from directive and threat by militants in the construction of all-important East-West Road stopped, and worked has since resumed.

Though kidnapping of oil workers and foreigners was rampant, as one of the bargaining strategies of the militants in the core Niger Delta region, that was almost give away in the region. Residents in the Niger Delta can now see in significant drop in crime rate in the region, bearing the fact that not less than 20,000 of their youths engaged in militancy and sundry crimes have now turned a new leaf. Specifically 20,192 militants embraced the amnesty and surrounded their weapons. In fact, according to the special adviser to the president and chief executive officer of the presidential Amnesty Programme, Mr. Timi Alaibe another group of over 6,000 who did not initial believe the amnesty programme would have work since turned in their weapons, as well, as King to be part of the programme.

AMNESTY OF THE RESCUE

Faced with looming collapse of the economy, the federal Government offered, in 2009 unconditional amnesty to militants in the zone who agreed to lay down their aims and assembly at screening centres within 60 days. Initially, government was targeting up to 10,000 militants whose attacks in the Niger Delta States had cost the country a third of its oil production.

At the expiration of the 60 days grace period-Sunday October 4, 2009 20, 192 Niger Delta militants had accepted the offer of amnesty. Thus the historical amnesty proclamation came into full effect. After the youths agreed to unconditionally accept pardon, they were placed on monthly stipend of N65,000 each while government also took care of their feeding and other needs while in camp. Unfortunately, the presidential Amnesty panel/committee of that time faced some challenges in moving the process of the critical second phase of demobilization and rehabilitation. This led President Goodluck Jonathan to disband the committee. He then passed the assignment to his special adviser on the Niger Delta to implement the programme, considered too critical to the nation’s economy and the corporate existence of Nigeria.

This led to the opening of a camp in OBUBRA community in Cross River State with the ex-fighters expected to undergo transformational training and reorientation programme for about 14 days per batch of between 1,000 and1,500 ex-militants.

The core of the programme is to remove the believe of the ex-militants in violence. It is also to liberate the pardoned from the burden of guilt from his past crimes. They are taught to avoid not only external physical violence but also internal violence of the spirit using the power of love. In a nutshell, this stage of engagement is to prepare the spirit of the formal illegal combatant for normal day-to-day living as a free law abiding citizen to strive for living like any other person.

The second phase of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) component of the amnesty programme is progressing on schedule.

So far, 8,955 former combatants, who graduated from the rehabilitation camp in Obubra, effectively demobilization and are now being placed in vocational/skills acquisition centres and institutions within and outside the country. As at November 1, 2010, the presidential Amnesty office had placed  5,457 of the ex-militants who have passed through the Obubra camp in training centres within Nigeria while arrangements have been concluded to send 1, 317 others to institutions and centres outside the country.

FORMAL EDUCATION

Some of the ex-militants have chosen formal education as against vocational training. This category consists mainly of those who did not complete school either at the primary or secondary and even post-secondary education.

With the down of a new era, they want to return to school and in line with the amnesty proclamation government is ready to assist them to achieve this goal. The classification team in the camp has checked the qualification of the former fighters who have passed out of the Obubra camp. Some have been recommended to undertake curses in some schools in the country and abroad.

By January 2009, Militancy in the Niger Delta had virtually crippled Nigeria’s economy. Investment inflow to the upstream sub-sector of the oil industry had dwindled remarkable frightened foreign investors had began redirecting their investment to Angola and Ghana as preferred destinations over Nigeria making Angola to surpass Nigeria as Africa’s highest crude oil producer.

The dwindling investments in Nigeria, mainstay threatened her capacity to grow its crude oil reserves. For example, due to militant activities in the Niger Delta royal Dutch Shell, by early 2009, saw its production drop from one million bpd to about 250,000 bpd.

Exxon Mobil also experienced increased insurgent activities in its Nigerian operations. Sabotage, oil siphoning rackets and kidnappings of oil workers by suspected militants further threatened the operations of the oil companies and exerted immense pressure on the Nigeria economy. Worse still, union officials often times called strikes to protest insecure working environment. It got to a point where Nigeria’s export dwindled to as low as 800,000 bpd at a time, compared with a targeted 2.2 million bpd for the first quarter of 2009 in 2008 alone, it was estimated that Nigeria lost over 3 trillion Naira as a result of militancy in the Niger Delta.

One year after the proclamation of amnesty for the militant agitators in the Niger Delta, the region has become one of the safest parts of Nigeria. Disbanded, the leaders of former militia groups who have accepted amnesty and embraced peace continued to be a immense help to the amnesty programme, they have been collaborating with the Amnesty officer and other agencies of government to consolidate the peace in the Niger delta.

Some of the former fighters  have even shown interests in politics, with  view to formally placing themselves in positions of civil authority from where they can positively affect the lives of millions of Nigeria Delta people in whose interests they earlier took up arms.

NIGER DELTA AMNESTY: DIVIDENDS?

In an effort to bring peace to the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s federal government created an amnesty program. The program required militants to surrender their weapons and in return, they would receive a presidential pardon, education, training and access to a rehabilitation program. The Amnesty offer was announced by President Yar’Adua in June and is set to end at midnight on October 4^th since its announcement, militants have turned in many guns and across the Delta region, much of the tension and violence, which peaked earlier this summer in battles between the joint task force and MEND militants, has seemingly ebbed it now appears that many militants are participating in the amnesty program and that there might be some dividends.

DIVIDENDS OF AN AMNESTY PROGRAM

It seems that the participation of militants in the amnesty offer is producing some benefits for the Nigerian government. Recently, it was announced that oil production and output increased a sharp contrast to the revelation that oil output dropped by the least half in the first quarter of 2009. Additionally, previously destroyed pipelines have now been fixed and will be operational in October 2009 and at least 5 illegal bunkering vessel have been detained in the last 2 months. Arms accumulation by militants and others is reportedly on a decline in the region and MEND has even extended its ceasefire until October 15^th.

As a result of these positive results, the Nigerian government has revered its previously reneged promises on power generation goals. The nations electricity operators, Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN) now says it will in fact reach its 6000WM in 2020.

THERE IS MUCH TO DO

Despite these benefits from the amnesty program and the co-operation of certain militants, it would be fool hardly to assume that the years of violence and insecurity in the Delta and even other parts of the country. Like Lagos which witnessed a MEND attack, are over a Ojo Maduekwe stated at a recent UN event.

The militants have accepted the amnesty. Now we need to fulfill our commitment that they are rehabilitation. If we could forive each other the brutalities of the civil war. I do not see why we can not bring a closure to the unfortunate violent chapter that was basically a legitimate struggle on the part of the Niger Delta which got hijacked by criminality.

In addition to the promised rehabilitation that Maduekwe mentioned there remain many instrumental issues that must be addressed to create a lasting peace not just for the benefit of oil companies, or the nations coffers, but most importantly, for Nigerian citizens. The militancy and violence of the Niger Delta did not originate out of thin air. These and other problems stemmed from clear deficiencies not the least of which is the fact that leaders like former Bayelsa Governor. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, have consistently stolen directly from the coffers of their oil producing states. They have done so with the complicity of Presidents and other government and non government actors. And, till this day, none have been forced to publicly account for their theft and greed (and the private bank account of the powerful) live in dire need of basic necessities. Not to speak of the national condition of poverty in a land of plenty, as the majority of Nigerians warn approximately $1 a day. In order to create a lasting peace, accountability, justice, education, health and other necessities will be necessary.

Considering the dire state of Nigeria electricity sector and the millions that have been spent with no result as revealed in the 2008 power probe, the achievement of the 6000MW target this December will be an accomplishment for this administration currently. Nigerians reportedly spent N796 billion of fuel generators annually.

Unfortunately, this target is well beyond what Nigeria needs now. According to Biodun Ogunleye, managing director of powereap limited, the minimum Nigeria should be aiming for in the short terms is 100,000MW, Being that many businesses have closed and moved to neighbouring countries, some of whom Nigeria actually exports to and citizens are held hostage by the cost of diesel (and those who control that sector) or darkness, this 6000MW target, while an improvement from the current 1000-2000MW, cannot be a plateau upon which the federal government choose to rest or hold up a success much more power must be generated.                                                                                 

AMNESTY AND THE PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT IN NIGER DELTA

          The scourge or restiveness in the Niger Delta coupled with military option of the federal government had its effects on the socio-economic and political environment. Domestically, the impact of the insurgency and the resultant reactions of the federal government endangered peace and retarded economic growth. In actual fact, since the insurgence of the crisis in 2006, attacks on oil installations alone had shut in one million barrel of crude oil per day.

          Thus, since military action compounded the crisis situation, a conciliatory measure was expedient. Amnesty therefore, is a conciliatory position of the government to “pardon” the militants and reintegrate them back into the larger society. Simple put, amnesty connotes a legislative or executive act that seeks to restore people who might have been found guilty of offences against the state. Section 175 (1-3) of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, empowers the president to “grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence create by an act of the national Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions. In exercising such power, the President is expected to consult with the council of the state. Thus, on June 25, 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua presented a 60-day amnesty programme for militants in the region to surrender their weapons in exchange for monetary rewards. The programme, essentially was meant to ensure that the region is free from armed militants.

          Will amnesty promote development in the Niger Delta? In other words, is it appropriate to attribute the parlous state of the development in the Niger Delta to the insurgent activities of militant groups? What are the factors that were responsible for the failure of past measure? For one, the region is a casualty of the oil economic and an epitaph of resource curse. The general popoola presidential committee on development options for the Niger Delta in March 1999 provided a clue into the recurring crisis in the region. The committee in its findings discovered that “substantial amounts of resources have been invested in the Niger Delta but without commensurate results. The point here is that the crisis in the area has nothing to do with the unavailability of resources of fix the problems but absence of good governance. Thus, it is instructive to state here that the issue of amnesty is not the solution to the problem of the area.

          In its report of the then military Head of State, General Abdusalami Abubakar, the committee did not absolve the federal government from complicity in the underdevelopment of the region. Rather, it indicted all levels of government “the communities and other stakeholders in the area for the unfortunate situation we have in the Niger Delta” (Reports of the Presidential committees. The committee therefore recommended both the long-term and short term measures to redress the parlous state of development in the area. The high point of the recommendation is the need for a 20 year regional master plan for Niger Delta. The essence of this plan is to ensure a comprehensive development plan for the entire region. This is the core requirement for any meaningful resolution of the crisis of development in the region. The Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) also offered some for reaching measures capable ending violence agitation in the area. In fact, the offer of amnesty was one of the recommendations of the NDTC.

          These recommendations are not novel. The popoola committee noted that successive administrations in Nigeria even prior to the discovery of oil, had taken series of measure to deal with the level of underdevelopment of the area.

          Each of the interventions measures had woefully failed to produce the desire results the non-performance of these government organs were mainly due to administrative failures.

          One can discuss the problems that are likely to confront this amnesty from this point of administrative failure. The Nigerian state possesses a character that induces systemic failure. The state as the organizational instrument of society is essential meant to provide the government with the necessary cohesive factor and maintain its unity of existence. Thus, political power is exercised through the state, and it is therefore the object of political competition. The chief role of the state is the maintenance of social and political order in society. The liberal and Marxist scholars differ on whose interest the state represents. To the liberal school, the state in neutral in the exercise of power, and therefore, it does not promote one interest against the other, this view refutes the contention of the Marxist school the state is an instrument that promotes the interest of the ruling class. Thus, To this end, the responsibility of the state is to protect and exhibits what the ruling class want at every particular time irrespective of the policy.

          Scholars have dissected the character of the Nigerian state and conclude that it is largely privatized. Here, politics is seen as a means of accumulating wealth, and because the state is the object of the political competition and medium for the allocation of resources, it has been effectively used to achieve the goal of primitive accumulation of wealth. The result is the privatization of the state by the ruling class and its consequent utilization for the pursuit of individuals, sectional and ethnic interests or the public good.

          This privatization project occupies the centre stage of governance and manifest in the prevalence of systematic corruption. The outcome is the series of failure that characterize various policies including those for the resolution of the Niger-Delta crisis staggering corruption and deepening social inequalities aggravate local resentment in the Niger Delta. If this character continues, will this amnesty work? Is this another opportunity for the ruling class to consolidate their power especially when 2011 general elections approach? A group of non-violent agitators in the Niger Delta has said that the amnesty was meant for “Politicians who are bent on using the former warlords to prosecute their political ambition in the next general elections. One cannot wish away the position because the latest violent agitation by many of the militants was a direct consequences of politics rather that genuine desire for the emancipation of the people of the Niger Delta. Chris Albinlackey of the Human rights watch had in 2007, accused the ruling class in Nigeria of engendering the proliferation of militants.

          Government corruption actively fuelled conflict in the Niger Delta because federal authority turned a blind eye of the efforts of the Delta politicians to arm criminal gangs to help them rig the 2003 elections.

          In spite of this pessimistic submission, there exist windows of opportunities of utilize this amnesty as a spring board for the development of the Niger Delta. The implementation of the recommendation of popoola committee as well as the position of the Niger Delta technical committee as well as the position of Niger Delta technical committee would go a long way in ensuring an end to the crisis of development to fail. It deals with pardon for the militants who would be willing tools in the hands of politician in 2011 for the prosecution of their political ambitions. There is the need for capacity building and constructive engagement of the demobilized militants. The failure in this regard has begin to manifest, for instance, in Ondo State, the “repentant” militant who were supposed to beat the rehabilitation camp had deserted the place because, according to the chairman of the Ijaw-speaking Eseode Local Government, no rehabilitation was taking place in Ondo State.

          I have said it before that the federal government must demonstrate seriousness in handling the repentant militants. I see this boys roaming about. I see them in the market, I see them on the streets but this time, without their guns. The residents of the community in which they are now living in fear. I am not trying to be an alarmist by the federal government should be more proactive in setting a motion activities already earmarked to engage the youths is productive venture. The amnesty programme was hurriedly put together, if not, by now, the boys would have been taken away from the streets. They should have taken them directly from the creeks and integrate them into the society .

          The Parlous state of the living condition of the people in the Niger Delta is obvious. Scholars and researchers, at different time have described the region as a theatre of irony and paradox. There is existence poverty in the midst of abundant natural mineral resources. To worsen the matter, political leaders in the region live in influence. Presiding over improvised people. The riches of the leaders are proceeds from public funds they diverted for the promotion of their private interests. This situation had created credibility problem for the leaders as the youths no longer trust them. Thus, the people have no other option that the resort of self help through armed struggle. Ibaba says that. The implication of corruption is the exacerbation of the material deprivations that have thrown up the conflicts and violence and the resultant military. Because the investment of resources in the people comes into conflict with the interests of the leaders they choose to neglect the people, they thereby sustain militancy.

          The leaders have demonstrated what is called “profitability of corruption”. The more the resources were allocated for the development of the area, the more the leaders engaged in monumental looting there by engendering, conspicuously, poverty, unemployment and absence of basic social amenities.

          It is obvious, that the crisis in the Niger Delta is beyond the issue of amnesty. Militant activities in the Niger Delta were not responsible for the years of neglect, marginalization and mismanagement of the resources by all the levels of government. The privatization of the Nigerian state is the real problem behind the failure of policy that characterize previous measures of redress the problem in the Niger Delta. The paper therefore subscribes to the position of the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) that issues of governance and the rule of law, socio-economic development and human development are the primary solution for a sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region.

4.2     SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSION

          The activities of militants have made peace to elude Nigeria especially the Niger Delta area for a long time in June 25, 2009 the amnesty of militants operating in the Niger Delta was announced by Nigeria’s President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua with the condition that the militants will renounce military within 60 days. He granted the amnesty in accordance with section 175 of the 1999 constitution which provides that the President may grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offences created by an act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions. A presidential panel on amnesty and disarmament of militants in the Niger Delta was then set up to manage the process. The militants were expected to demobilize and their arms surrendered at designated centres to pave way for rehabilitation and reintegration. The amnesty initiative started on August 6, 2009 and ended in Oct 4 2009. The federal government declared amnesty for all militants with a view of disarming and rehabilitating them. The amnesty programme is part of the federal government’s strategies to end the violence in the oil region, which has hampered oil production, the nation’s main foreign exchange earner the last notable militant to surrender emotionally was government Ekpemupola popularly known as Tompolo, who publicly accepted the amnesty with over 3000 militants under his command. Thousand of people gathered in Oporoza and Warrito witness the disarmament ceremony. Tompolo was short of words ruling most of the handover, able to say only “all is well, all is well” to the crowed before bursting into tears. We came because we want peace, said chief Andrew Anegba, who was among the thousand gathered in Warri to greet Tompolo before the ceremony. The last militant groups are giving up arms, and that means peace is coming back, said Anegba, a traditional Ijaw ethnic community leader from Ogbe-Ijoh, close to where security forces used helicopters and gunboats to attack Tompolo’s camp in May 2009 President Yar’Adua’s amnesty offer is the most concerted effort so far to bring peace to the Delta. Unrest in the region has prevented Nigeria which vies with Angola as Africa’s biggest oil producer, from pumping much above two thirds of its production capacity. It also costs the country $1 billion a month is lost revenue, according to the Central Bank, and has helped to push up global energy prices.

          The most important question is Can amnesty to militants brings about sustainable peace to the Niger Delta? This question becomes pertinent because the line between militancy and crime is blurred. Some militants have grown rich from a trade in stolen crude oil and extortion, with hundreds of expatriate and wealthy Nigerians kidnapped for ransom over the past three years. Skeptics say that even if commander disarm, there is little hope to stop fighters from finding new leaders and resuming attacks. Some residents fear they will return to the creeks unless those who had over their weapons can quickly find work.

4.3     RECOMMENDATIONS

DISARMAMENT DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

          The amnesty programme is basically DDR oriented Disarmament, Demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants are the first step in the transition from war to peace. However, DDR is much more complicated in a post-conflict environment, when different fighting groups are divided by animosities and face a real security dilemma as they give up their weapons, when civil society structure have crumbled, and when the economy is stagnant. DDR supports the transition from war to peace by ensuring a safe environment, transferring ex-combatant back to civilian life, and enabling people to earn livelihoods through peaceful means instead of war.

          DDR is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations, and a generally theory strategy employed by all UN peacekeeping operation. Disarmament is the first phase of DDR and logically precedes demobilization and reintegration. However, it is often a long-term process. It entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents, disarmament is important not only for the material improvement of security conditions but also for its psychological impact. There are added psychological benefits when ex-combatants physically disable their own weapons, and are led in doing so by their commanders, immediately upon entering the disarmament site. The process symbolically underscores the transition from military of civilian life. Additionally, public destruction of weapons is an important tool in sensitizing the population and promoting the DDR program (Massimo 2003).

          Demobilization entails the disbanding of armed groups. Demobilization, includes assembly of ex-combatants, orientation programs, and transportation of the communities of destination. These movements of large groups of people should be timed to coincide with phases of civilian life that facilitate reintegration, such as crop and school cycle. According to Massimo (2003) demobilization requires.

          Assembly of ex-combatants, this helps ensure their participation in the DDR program, through their disarmament, registration, and access to DDR benefits in the form of goods and services. When ex-combatants are assembled, they are first registered and then receive civilian identification cards which allow the holders to participate in the DDR program and receive benefits. Encampments are not intended to host ex-combatant for a long time, but adequate facilities, food supplies, and medical assistance are important to maintain discipline and security. In addition, encampments infrastructure should be built to meet not only the needs of ex-combatants, but also of the many dependents who may follow them. Orientation of ex-combatants. This is essential in establishing and reinforcing ex-combatants beliefs that the DDR program offers viable alternatives to conflict as a livelihood. Pre-discharge orientation has important practical and psychological functions. Practically, it provides ex-combatants and their dependents with basic information about the DDR program. Psychological, it empowers DDR beneficiaries as free citizens, by addressing their needs and doubts and asking for their interactive participation, the pre-discharge orientation typically focuses on the DDR program, the implementing agencies, the rights and obligations of participants, and how they can access the program’s benefits general information is also offered about reintegration into civilian life, such as health issues, education and employment opportunities, and access to land and credit. Post-discharge orientation caters to more specific needs, in the context of the community of resettlement. Post-discharge orientation is the step in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides information about the place of relocation, economic opportunities, and relevant local institutions and social networks, including religious group, NGOs veterans associations, farmers associations, women groups, and others. After ex-combatants have been demobilized, there effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict. Reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society, ensuring against the possibility of resurgence of armed conflict. In the short term, ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict. In the longer term, disaffected veterans can play an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarizing the political debate, becoming easy target of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. Massimo (2003) argues that reintegration includes.

i.        Reinsertion: this addresses the most immediate needs of ex-combatants. Reinsertion assistance consist of short term relief intervention, which provide a safety net for demobilized ex-combatants. Assistance may include housing, medical care, food, and elementary education for children. The distribution of cash allowances has proven to be the most effective and efficient way to provide reinsertion assistance. Cash payments are preferred over in kind assistance because of reduced transaction costs, easier and more transparent accounting, and because cash payment can adapt more closely the specific needs of beneficiaries, additionally cost allowance have the positive psychological effect of empowering ex-combatants to take charge of their lives. However, cash payments present two dilemmas: they can give the negative impression of being “cash for weapons, and they can be easily lost or misused for consumption and pleasure. A common solution to this problem is to distribute destination to generate installments and accompanies by post-discharge counseling.

ii.       Economic reintegration: This is final requirement for a DDR program to be successful and sustainable in the long-term. The goal of economic reintegration efforts is to provide ex-combatants with financial dependence through employment different initiatives should cater to the special needs of disabled veterans who cannot reintegrate into the labour force, for rural settlers, and for urban settlers. Common economic integration programs include education and professional training, public employment encouragement of private initiative through skills development and micro credit support, and access to land.